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Abstract 
The paper characterises the nonmonotonic nference relation associated with the stable 
model semantics for logic programs as follows: a formula is entailed by a program in the stable 
model semantics if and only if it belongs to every intuitionisticaily complete and consistent ex- 
tension of the program formed by adding only negated atoms. In place of intuitionistic logic, 
any proper intermediate logic can be used. © 1999 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. 
Keywords: Stable models; Nonmonotonic nference; lntuitionistic logic; Intermediate logics; 
Equilibrium logic 
1. Introduction 
The stabh, model semantics lbr logic programs, due to Geifond and Lifschitz [8], 
gives rise to a natural (sceptical) nonmonotonic inference relation that has been 
widely investigated over the past ten years since its inception. Despite the wealth 
of results and insights obtained, stable model inference (in the sequel just stable fl~- 
ference) remains to some extent an enigma. It has been shown to be closely related to 
Reiter's default logic [8], to Moore's autoepistemic logic and to other systems of non- 
monotonic reasoning (see e.g. [16,19,23]) yet, until recently, a simple, non-modal, 
logical characterisatlon f stable inference, e.g. in terms of minimal models, was elu- 
sive. The downside has been that it has not always proved easy to compare stable 
inference with other forms of nonmonotonic reasoning, particularly those based 
on preferential models: and there is, even today, no general agreement about how 
stable inference should be extended, if at all, to encompass first-order theories or oth- 
er classes of theories more general than logic programs. 
I A preliminary version of this paper appeared in E. Weydert, G. Brewka & C. Witteveen (Eds), Proc. 
DGNMR97. Third Dutchl(h,rtmm l¥orkshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning Techniqt,les ami their Applica- 
tions, MP! Research Report, SaarbriJcken, 1997. 
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In this note we extend the work of two earlier papers, [24,25], in order to obtain an 
extremely simple, logical characterisation f stable models and the stable inference 
relation. It is applicable to disjunctive as well as normal logic programs, and, with 
minor modification, to logic programs containing an additional, 'strong' negation 
operator. Our approach differs from other declarative, logical characterisations of 
stable inference mainly in the following ways. First, the expressions ('clauses' or 
'rules') of logic programs are sometimes interpreted as inference rules (as in [22]) 
or as Gentzen sequents (as in [1]); we interpret hem as ordinary logical formulas 
whose main connective is implication. Secondly, the notion of model used to charac- 
terise stable inference is quite often an ad hoc construction, ot explicitly related to 
an~,' ordinary notion of logical model (as in the case of 'minimal model' in [3] or 'un- 
founded-free set' in [15]): we use a standard notion of model, familiar from the logic 
literature. Thirdly, unlike the approaches taken in e.g. [16,19,23], ours is based on a 
well-known alternative to classical logic, rather than an epistemic or modal extension 
of classical ogic. Lastly, unlike all the above, our characterisations of stable infer- 
ence are independent of the restricted syntax of logic programs and can therefore 
be used to formulate more general, extended concepts of stable reasoning, ~ay tbr 
first-order theories. 3 
As a foretaste, let me summarise and illustrate the main result of the paper. When 
we reason classically from theory//, we reason in effect from the complete consistent 
extensions of the theory, i.e. from thee ries //' such that/7 c_//' and H' is (consistent 
and) complete in the sense that either// i -  tp or / / '  k- -,~o, but not both, for any sen- 
tence tO in the language of the theory. The reason is that, classically, we regard a sen- 
tence ~ as being a logical consequence of H if it is true in all models of H. But each of 
the latter defines a consistent and complete xtension of H, and each model of a con- 
sistent and complete xtension of H is in turn a model of H. So the property that ~ is 
true in all models of H is equivalent to the condiaon that ~ belongs to every consis- 
tent and complete xtension of H. The latter characterises therefore ordinary, mono- 
tonic inference in ~:lassical logic. 
But what hap~'¢ns now if we alter the underlying logic, say by changing the notion 
of model and d.:civability, in particular to one in which the excluded n, iddle (¢p v -~p) 
is no longer ~ did? in that case, not every model will determine a complete theory, so 
we should expect hat reasoning from complete xtensions will now be stronger than 
reasoning from all models. Consider the simple propositional theory//comprising a 
single sentence 
-~A - .  B, 
where .4, B are distinct atoms. Classically there are three complete xtensions, defined 
by the deductive closure of {A,-~B}, of {B,-,A}, and of {A,B}, respectively. Each 
contains the disjunction :4 v B) which is therefore a consequence of H and indeed 
equivalent to it. By contrast, in intuitionistic logic/7 does not derive A v B, though 
this sentence holds in each of the intuitionistically complete xtensions of H, deter- 
mined once again by {,4,-~B} by {B,-,A} and by {A,B}, respectively. It follows that 
The approach taken in [23] is also quite general, since it is based on a recursive tr~mslation of logical 
l'ormulas into m~lal logic. 
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inference based on the intuitionisticaUy complete xtensions of a theory is, in general, 
stronger than ordinary intuitionistic inference. 
We have already captured a significant part of the essence of stable inference, 
namely that it can be viewed as based on reasoning from intuitionistically complete 
extensions of a theory. But there is a further, vital feature still missing. Viewed as 
a logic program,//actually entails the atom B under the stable model semantics. 
In fact the theory based on {B, -,A} (call this//~) is 'stable', whilst the other minimal 
extension {.4, -,B} (call it//2) is not. Moreover, entailment is nonmonotonic, since if 
we e,~tend/l by adding the sentence A V C we can no longer derive B. In the present 
context he decisive difference between//~ and//2 is this: (the intuitionistic losure) 
of//! can be obtained from//merely by adding negated atoms (in this case just --,A). 
By contrast no consistent extension o f / /by  negated atoms will intuitionistically de- 
rive//:. In particular, intuitionistically,//u {-~} derives not A but only the weaker 
statement, -,-,A. We have now fully captured stable inference: an atom A is a stable 
consequence of a theory// i f  and only if it belongs to every intuitionistically consis- 
tent and complete xtension of H obtained by adding negated atoms. In turn, a sta- 
ble model of/7 is precisely the collection of atoms true in such an intuitionistically 
consistent and complete xtension of H. ~ 
Note that this conforms well with the idea that stable inference aims at providing 
a notion of negation-by-default. Weare allowed to assume any negated atoms by de- 
fault, as long as the resulting extension of the theory is consistent, but we do not 
jump directly to any default assumptions about positive atoms. We keep adding 
negated atoms to the theory until we reach a point where all questions are decided 
(completeness). Since not all theories can be completed in this manner mere- 
ly by the addition of negated atoms, there are cases where no stable, models exist 
at all. 
Note too that we cannot relax either of the key restrictions here. If we were to ad- 
mit extensions formed by adding positive atoms, then, in the example above, /7, 
would be an admissible xtension of ll, and B would no longer be stably derivable. 
Similarly, if we used classical ogic to define deductive closures, we could again ob- 
tain//2 merely by adding the negated atom -,B to / /and closing under classical con- 
sequence. As we shall see later, we are not actually forced to choose intuitionistic 
logic, as there is a range of nonclassical logics that are equally admissible. 
Lastly, let us see how nonmonotonicity arises in stable inference. Consider the 
theory/7' lbrmed by adding to H the sentence A V C, where C is another distinct at- 
om. There are now two complete xtensions of H obtained by adding negated atoms. 
Adding to//'-,A derives B by detachment and also C by disjunctive syllogism, yield- 
ing an intuitionistically consistent and complete theory. Adding to II'-,C derives, 
again by disjunctive syllogism, A, and so is also complete. So there are now two sta- 
ble models Whereas B was derivable from// in the absence of any evidence for A, it 
is no longer derivable from ll', since the statement A v C now provides evidence 
for A. 
2. Preliminaries 
This section reviews the main definitions and results needed tbr the remainder of 
the paper. 
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2.1. Logic programs 
First let me recall the syntax of logic programs. I use standard logical notation, 
rather than the special notation often employed in logic programming. In the setting 
of disjunctive logic programs, program formulas are built-up from atomic formulas 
using the logical constants: A, V, --+, -,, standing respectively for conjunction, disjunc- 
tion, implication, and negation. Negation is often denoted by the symbol 'not' and 
referred to as negation-as-failure or negation-by-default. The nonlogical v~cabulary 
comprises a fixed set of predicate symbols (no function symbols) and a nonempty set 
of names. This language will be left implicit throughout. 
Program formulas with free variables are treated as shorthand for the set of their 
ground instances, so that a logic program can be represented as a collection H of 
closed program formulas having the following form 
A! A . . .  AAmA "Am+l A""  A "~A, ~ BI V . . .  V B~, (2.1) 
where A, and Bj are ground (closed) atoms. These formulas are often called rules and 
written in a different notation, actually back-to-front: but the form is always the 
same. There is a single arrow, preceded by conjunctions of atoms and negated atoms, 
and followed by a disjunction of atoms. We may have m or n zero, or m = n:. but we 
always have k >I I. Given a program II, we denote by .~' the Herbrand base of H, i.e. 
the set of all atoms in the language of H. We use ,g-  to denote the collection of all 
negated atoms in the language of H, i.e. ,r/- = {-,A:A E ,~}. 
Stable models were actually defined for the case where k = !, so-called normal 
programs. But the definition was quickly generalised to cover programs with formu- 
las of type (2.1) in [9,26]: as well as programs containing a new, strong or explicit 
negation operator. For reasons of space we do not repeat here the definition of stable 
models and their generalisation (answer sets): the reader is referred instead to [8,9]. 
2.2. hm¢itionistic h~gic 
Classical ogic is based on the (classical) notion of truth, whereby every proposi- 
tion is either true or false, independent of our knowledge of its truth-value, in con- 
structive reasoning this principle (of tertimn mm datur) is rejected, and logic is built 
upon the notion of (constructive) proqf The standard formalisation of the logic of 
constructive reasoning is due to Heyting [12], and called imuitionistic logic. We de- 
note it by H. in intuitionistic logic, terms and formulas are built-up in the usual man- 
ner, usiag the logical constants of H: ^, v, --, --, and the quantifiers 3, V. However, 
one explains the meaning of the connectives and quantifiers, not in terms of classical 
truth-conditions, but in terms of constructions acting on proofs. There are many 
variations on this ~,'xplanation, which, when made sufficiently precise, lead to logical 
calculi equivalent Io Heyting's (see any standard text, e.g. [5]) lntuitionistic logic can 
readily be presented in any of the usual 'deductive' styles, e.g. as a tableau system, a
natural deduction ~ystem or as a Gentzen-style sequent calculous. For example, the 
sequent calculus for H restricts equents on the right to single formulas: the natural 
deduction rules follow those of classical logic, except hat the classical rule redtwtio 
ad absurdum is omitted. H is a proper subsystem of classical logic: every intuitionis- 
tically valid tbrmula is also classically valid, but not conversely. The derivability re- 
lation for H will be d'moted by I--H. 
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There are several types of semantics for intuitionistic logic. We mention here only 
the method of Kripke models, also known as possible worlds semantics. Formally, 
one starts with a so-called Kripke frame :F, where 
~= (W, <~), 
W is a set and <~ is a partial-ordering on W. The elements of W are sometimes called 
possible worlds. One may also think of  them intuitively as stages (in the growth of 
knowledge). At each world or stage w E W some primitive propositions (atoms) 
are verified as true, and, once verified at some stage w, an atom A remains true at 
every 'later' stage, i.e. at all w' such that w ~< w' (in this sense knowledge may grow 
in several directions, but verified propositions are never subsequently forgotten). A
Kripke model .1/can therefore be represented as a frame .:T together with an assign- 
ment i of sets of atoms to each element of W, such that if w ~< w' then i(w) c_ i(w'). An 
assignment is then extended inductively to all formulas via the following rules: 
tp A ~ S i(w) i f f tps i (w)  ~b S i(w) 
tp V ~b E i(w) iff tp E i(w) or ~ E i(w) 
tp -~ ~b E i(w) iff for all w'such that w ~< ,' ~.  tp E i(w') implies ~, E i(w') 
-~tp E i(w) iff for all w'such that w <<. w', tp ~ i(w') 
(we omit here the semantics of quantification). 
A formula tp is true in a Kripke model . / /a t  world w, in symbols .//, w ~ tp, iff 
tp E i(w). tp is true in a Kripke model .¢/, in symbols ./! ~ tp, if it is true at all worlds 
in .11. A formula tp is said to be valid, in symbols, ~H tp, if it is true in all Kripke 
models, tp is said to be an H-consequence of a set / /o f  formulas, written/- /~n tp, 
iff for all models .¢/and any world w E .// ..... //, W t':'-- /7 ~ , / / ,  14) ~ (D' 4 The Kripke 
semantics i  complete for H in the sense that for all H and tp 
/7 ~'n tp iff /7 ~n tp. (2.2) 
We use Oot(H) to denote the set of all H-consequences of a theory H. and we de- 
note by Th(.J#) the set ofall sentences true in a Kripke model.//. Two models. / /and 
.~1' are said to be equivalent if Th(.#) = Th(.I '). 
By regarding a stable model as a one-world Kripke model, we can also use the 
above semantics to define what it means Ibr a formula tp to be true in a stable m,~del 
.,#. Then we can define stable inference or entailment by saying that a Ibrmula ~p is 
entailed by a program/7 if tp is true in every stable model of/7. 
2.3. b~termediate logics 
We shall also consider intermediaw logics, obtainedby adding additional axioms 
to H; they are complete wrt a generalised notion of Kripke frame. An intermediate 
logic is called proper if it is strictly contained in classical ogic. In the laltice of inter- 
mediate propositional logics (extensively investigated in the literature) classical ogic 
4 in possible worlds semantic Ibr modal logic, the corresponding concept is son~etinaes called k~cal 
consequence, to emphasise that it is relativised to each world in a Kripke-structure. r~ther than an entire 
model. 
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has a unique lower cover which is the supremum of all proper intermediate logics. 5 
This greatest proper intermediate logic I shall denote by J, and its corresponding 
consequence operation by Cnj. It is often referred to as the logic of"here-and-there", 
since it is characterised by linear Kripke frames having precisely two elements or 
worlds: 'here' and "there'. J is also characterised by the three element Heyting alge- 
bra, and is known by a variety of other names, including the Smetanich logic, and 
the logic of 'present and future'. Truth tables for J were already given by Heyting 
[12], and the logic was further used by G/bdel in a paper of 1932, [10, 11] (hence it 
is sometimes known as Grdel's 3-valued logic). However, it was apparently first ax- 
iomatised by Lukasiewicz [17]. He characterised J by adding to H the axiom schema 
- .  - .  
He also showed that disjunction is definable in J. 6 An algebraic haracterisation 
of J is straightlbrward (see e.g. [14]); for present purposes, however, it is more prac- 
tical to use the Kripke-model characterisation. This logic forms the basis for equilib- 
rium reasoning, to be discussed below. 
2.4. Negation stability 
In [25] we introduced the following notion of negation-stability, byanalogy to the 
familiar (modal or epistemic) concept of stability, due to Stalnaker [28] and McDer- 
mott and Doyle [20]. Let L be an ordinary (monotonic) logic with inference opera- 
tion CL. Assume the language of L includes the negation sign, '--,'. Let H be a set of 
L-sentences. Then, we say that a set E of L-sentences i an L-negation-stable exten- 
sion of / / i f f  
E = CL(II U {-,p: <p ¢' E}). (2.3) 
Now an inference relation I~ can be said to be ne:zation-stahle over L if H I~, q~ 
holds if and only if ~p belongs to every L-negation-stable extension of H. In this man- 
ner we regard stability not, as is customary, as a condition on beliefs but simply as a 
condition on the negation operator, '-,'. 
2.5. Equilibrium logic 
Let J be the Smetanich logic of here-and-there. Then J is determined by Kripke 
models based on the 2-element, 'here-and-there' frame. Each J-model can be r~pre- 
sented as a structure/{h, t}, <~, i), where the worlds h and t are reflexive, and h ~< t. 
For any world h~ we use the corresponding upper-case l tter H~ to denote the set of 
all atoms true at h,: i.e. we set H~ = {A:~ ~ i(h~)}. For a world h, we often write 
'h, [:-- ¢', instead o f '¢  ~ i(h~)'. Note tt, at for any such model ({h,t}, ~< ,i) we always 
have H c_ T. A model ({h, t}, ~< ,i) may also be represented simply by the pair 
(H. T). The following concepts are taken from [24]. 
s An excellent general source of intblmation on intermediate propositional logics is [4]. 
6 Smetanich studied the logic J in [25']. Important results about he logic can also be found in 1"!8]. 
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Definition 2.1. A model ({h, t}, ~<, V) of H is said to be h-minimal over t i f f  for every 
model ({h', t'}, ~<, V) of/7, whenever T' = T and H' c_ H, then H' = H. 
Definition 2.2. A model ({h, t}, <~, V) of/7 is said to be an equilibrium model of/7 iff 
it is h-minimal over t and H = T. 
Thus an equilibrium model is a model ({h, t}, ~<, V) in which H = T and no other 
model verifying the same atoms at its t-world verifies fewer atoms at its h-world. 
Equivalently, an equilibrium model is one in which there are no undecidable atoms 
and no other model falsifies precisely the same atoms while verifying fewer atoms. 
Clearly an equilibrium model is equivalent to a one-element model. 
Definition 2.3. A sentence tp is said to be an equilibrium consequence of a theory/7, in 
symbols/7 I"e tp, iff~t" ~ tp, for every equilibrium model .A r~" of 17. A theory E such 
that /7  c_ E is said to be an equilibrium expansion of/7,  if E = Th(,;¢'), for some 
equilibrium model .A" of/7. 
Equilibrium logic is the logic determined by the equilibrium consequences of a 
theory. We now recall the main result of [25], that equilibrium reasoning coincides 
with negation-stable r asoning over J. 
Proposition 2.4 [25]. For any theory II, a consistent extension E of 11 is an equilibrium 
expansion of [I if and only if it is a J-negation-stable extension of/7. 
The relevance of this to stable inference in the context of logic programs is made 
clear by the following result from [24] 
Proposition 2.5 [24]. Let 11 be a logic program. A set H of atoms is a stahh, model of I1 
if and only ([H is the set q/'a~'oms true in some equilibrium model of/7. 
Below, we shall sometimes refer to a stable model of a program as an equilibrium 
model .//' and sometimes as the set of atoms true in an equilibrium model./,,', i.e. as 
the set ~ N Th(.¢/). This ambiguity should be quite harmless however. In virtue of 
the above, negation-stability yields a defining characteristic tbr stable inference. 
We can therefore re-express the notion of stable model as follows 
Proposition 2.6. For any logic program II, a set S of atoms is a stable model of 17 (if" 
S = E f3 .;~a, for some J-negation-stable extension E of H. 
3. Main result 
In this section we extend the above results. First, we can rephrase Proposition 2.4 
by saying that ~¢[ is an equilibi'ium model of II iff 
rh(.l/) = Cn j (n  u ,p rh(.a) } ). (3.1) 
Our next step will be to show thaL i f / / is  a logic program, then the same Eq. (3.1) 
holds where J is replaced by intuitionistic logic, H. 
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Proposition 3.1. Let /7 be a logic program. A here-and-there model ~g of /7  is an 
equilibrium model of 17 iff 
rh(~#) = Cn,(n u {-~o • ~o ¢ rh(..,~)}). (3.2) 
Proof. Let E be a consistent H-negation-stable extension of / / .  In other words 
e = Cn.(n u {-,~o: ~o ¢ E)). 
We first show that E = Th(d/) for some equilibrium model ~# of/7. By consisten- 
cy, for each formula ~o, 
~peE ~-¢EE.  
Since E forms a complete theory, all Kripke-models of E are equivalent (i.e. validate 
the same sentences). Then clearly for any here-and-there models ({h,t}, ~< ,i) and 
({h',t'}, ~ ,i) of E, we must have H = H', since the models verify the same atoms. 
Similarly, since by negation-stability over H every model of E verifies -~-~¢p--, ~p, 
for every ~p, we must have T = T' = H. It remains to show that, among models of 
H, h is h-minimal over t. To this end, consider any model ({h',t'}, ~< ,i) of H, such 
that T' = T and H' c_ H. Now, for any sentence ¢p, h' ~ -~p iff t' ~ ~p. Hence, since 
T' = T, E is negation-stable and/{h,t}, ~< ,i) ~ E, we have 
¢p ~ E =~ t ~ rp :=~ t' ~ rp =~ h' ~ -~p. 
Consequently, ({h',t'}, ~< ,i) ~ H u {-,¢p: ¢p ~ E}, and so H' = H. It follows that 
({h,t}, <~ ,i) is an equilibrium model of H. Conversely, suppose that g = (H, T) 
is an equilibrium model of/7. Then, by Eq. (3.1), 
c , , (  n u { .~: ~ ¢ rh(.Jtt) }) c rh(.//). 
it remains to verify 
rh(,//) ~ Cn.(n u {-,p: ,p ¢ rh(.//) )), 
We do this by showing that any model ~//' of 
nu ( -¢:¢ ¢ 77,(.//)} 
is equivalent to ,g. Let .g'  = (W, ~ ,i) be an arbitrary Kripke-model of the above, 
where i is the assignment of atoms to worlds. Then for any atom A, 
A ¢ 7' ~ .//' ~= -,A, (3.3) 
A E T =~ . ,~'~ -,-,A. (3.4) 
From Eq. (3.3) we can coaclude that no world in .//' verifies more than the atoms 
in 7'. From Eq. (3.4) we know that, by the truth-conditions for -,-,A, for any atom A 
in 7' and any world w E W, in ..g' d eventually becomes true on every chain ascend- 
ing from w. Since this holds for all A E T, it follows that every chain ascending from 
w eventually verifies precisely T. Take any world w E W and let w' be any successor 
of w o:erifying exactly T. Since every successor of w' also verifies precisely T, w' can be 
considered a one-world Kripke model of/7. 
Now form the substructure, t of . / / '  consisting solely of w and ,tJ, with relation 
<~ and assignment i restricted to (w,,4). We argue that .4~'= ({w, w'}, <~ ,i) is a 
model of/7. First, X ,  ~4 ~ H, tbr the reason just given. So we need to show that 
./i ~". w I=-/7. What we know is that .... //', w ~/7, since .... //' is a model of /7. But 
.g', w ~/7  implies that for all formulas 
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in/7, 
AI A . . .  A Am A ~A,,,+! A • • • A ~A,, ~ Bi V .. • V Bk 
.,,//', w ~ A, A . . .  A Am and .... //', w ~ -~A,,,+~ A . . .  A -~A,, 
=~ J / ' ,  w ~ B i V-..  V B~.. 
This is equivalent to 
AI , . . . ,A , ,  E i(w) and Am+l, . . . ,A ,  ~ T 
=*" Bt E i(w), for some I = 1, . . . ,k  
since, by Eq. (3.3) any atom not in T is false at w, and by Eq. (3.4) any atom in T 
cannot be false at w. But this is precisely the truth-condition at w for a formula of 
17 in a here-and-there model ({w, w'}, ~<, i/. Therefore, ~/~, w ~/7,  and so .4'" is a 
here-and-there model of H. 
Lastly, since i(w') = T and since .t! is h-minimal over t and H = T (by equilibri- 
um), we must have i(w) = H = T = i(w'). Consequently, since w was an arbitrarily 
chosen world, in .//', i (w)= T, for all w E IV. So ..... / /  is equivalent o .t l ,  as re- 
quired. [] 
! 
We have thereby established 
Proposition 3.2. For any logic program/7, a set S o f  atoms is a stable model of~7 i f  and 
only i f  S = E N .~ ]br some H-negation-stable extension E of/7, i.e. where 
E = u E}). 
As usual, a theory H is L-complete (L a logic) if and only it" tbr every formula ¢p, 
either tp or --,tp is L-derivable from/7. 
We state a slight strengthening of Propo,.dtion 3. I. 
Proposition 3.3. Let 11 be a hJgic program. E is an H-negation stabh, extension of  
H iff E = Cnn(HU {-~A C .Y / :A  ¢. E}) 
This brings us to the central result. 
Thcorem 3.4. Let rl he a logic program. (i) I f  .J# is a stable mode/' o f /7 ,  then 
/7 U {-~A E .~ " A ~ .#} is intuitionisticaily consistent and ',mq~lete. (ii) Le t /7  U A 
be intuitionisticaily consistent and complete, where A C_ .~ ....... ; then 
{A E .~: i l  U A ~n A } is a stable model o.1" ll. 
Proof. Part (i) is immediate from Propositions 3.2 and 3.3: if.ff is stable, then T/z(.//) 
is intuitionistically consistent and complete, hence also/7 u {-~A ~ .~: A ~ .//}. For 
part (ii), assume the hypothesis. Then, by completeness, all models o f /7  u A are 
equivalent. Suppose .1/~ H u A. Then by consistency and completeness, for all 
atoms A, 
A rh(.!,') n u, l  b--,,1. 
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It remains to show that .# (or more strictly Th(./() n ,g) is stable. Since Th(. #) is 
complete, . / /~  A and A c_ .g- ,  it follows that A c_ {--,A:A f~ Th(.//)}. Therefore 
~,(.//) = cnn(n  u a) c_ c , , , , (n  u {-~A:A ¢ ~,(.//)}). 
, 
But, since. / /~ (H U {-,A" X ~ Th(.//) }), conversely 
o , . (n  u {-~A: A ~ ~7,(. I/) }) C rh(.//). 
By Propositions 3.1 and 3.3 therefore Th(,/l) is negation-stable over H and ~/l is a 
stable model of/-/. [] 
4. Default explanations 
It is quite natural to reformulate the concept of stable inference within an expla- 
nation-theoretic setting. Normally in the logic of explanation one assumes there is a 
theory II, an observed fact 0 (cal!edthe.e.vplanm~dum) to beexplained, and an ex- 
planatory hypothesis E (usually known as the explanans and often taking the form 
of a conjunction of atomic observations) uch that 
l IuE~-O.  
In the case of logic programs with a notion of negation-by-default or negation-as- 
failure, we can imagine an analogous concept of default explanation, where the de- 
fault explanans E is no longer a collection of observed facts but rather a collection 
of negated atoms that are assumed to hold by default in the absence of contrary ev- 
idence. 
Without loss of generality, we can also assume that a potential default explanans 
is actually generated by its complement set of positive atoms. We always assume a
background theory, or logic program H, and logical entailment is taken to be intu. 
~tionistic. So we can say that a set of atoms X provides a default explanation of an 
atomic I'ormula .,! iff 
r lu  { -~o: o ¢ x} ~-. .~, 
X is then called the &~limlt exphmans of A wrt //. Notice that, although we arc 
assuming that what is not in X is false (by default}, we make no formal assumption 
about the members of X being true: and an atom in X may or may not be default 
explained by X itself. 
For any set X of atoms, define 
X" := {A E .~': X is a deiault explanans of .4 }. 
X" can therefore be regarded as something like the {default) explanatory content 
or jbrce of X. The following corollary of the previous propositions i  straightfor- 
ward. 
Corollary 4.1. For wO' logic program H, X is a stable model of  H (If X = X*. 
So, in particular, stable models are self-explanatory, and a stable consequence of
H is a formula default explained by all self-explanatory detault explanans. 
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5. Related work 
']?he present paper was inspired by the well-known work of Eshghi and Kowalski 
[7], developing an abductive framework for logic programming. In particular, they 
relate the stable models of a normal program/7 to certain abductive xtensions of 
a transformation of/7 in which negation (as failure) is removed. Eshghi and Kowal- 
ski already isolated two key features of stable models: that (besides consistency) a 
notion of completeness is involved, and that what should be added to the program 
(in their terminology, the abducibles) should correspond essentially to negated at- 
oms. Their use of classical logic, however, leads to a much less direct and straight- 
forward formulation of stability. The present account can be considered a 
simplification of theirs, as well as a generalisation to disjunction and strong negation 
(see below). For a survey of further work on abductive frameworks for logic pro- 
gramming, see [13]. 
Recently, Niemelii and Simons [22] have characterised the stable models of nor- 
mal programs using a tbrm of complete xtensions of programs by negated atoms. 
Once again, they employ classical logic, and are led accordingly to a different formu- 
lation of the completeness condition. However, unlike Eshghi and Kowalski, they do 
not eliminate negation by adding new predicates to the language; rather they treat 
program clauses not as logical formulas but as inference rules. Mathematically, their 
characterisation is rather powerful, as it leads naturally to the design of efficient al- 
gorithms for computing stable models and stable consequences. How to combine 
these with the methods of the present paper is an interesting topic for future work. 
Another approach to understanding stable reasoning, in a style similar to the ex- 
planation-theoretic one, was developed by Dung [6]. In fact, Dung applies an argu- 
mentation-theoretic framework in which stable models can be understood as special 
kinds of 'sell-supporting' arguments. In this approach a very weak concept of proof, 
essentially only involving mo&ts ponens, is used. And again the role of negated atoms 
is highlighted: Dung's arguments are sets of negated atoms. D:mg's char~ctcrisation 
of stable reasoning is also applied to extended, but not to disjunctive, programs, and 
it can be derived t'rom the methods of this paper. 
More recently, an argumentation semantics has been developed in [2] Ik~r so-called 
assmnpthm-based frameworks for del'ault reasoning in general. Stable models and 
other semantics for normal and extended programs are ¢haracterised in this setting. 
Again, logic program clauses are not identified with logical formulas (they may be 
identified with inference rules) and the notion of proof or 'deduction' i~ ,~ very weak 
one, involving essentially only a form of modus ponens. Whilst in the case of logic 
programs only negated atoms form allowed assumptions, the authors also develop 
a notion of stable set of assumptions that is defined for more general nonmonotonic 
theories. It remains to investigate how this concept of stability relates to negation- 
stability discussed here. 
Unlike the other approaches to studying stable i,al'erence mentioned above, we 
identify programs with sets of ordinary logical formulas, apply a standard logical no- 
tion of completeness, and treat the case of disjunctive programs as well. Unlike those 
approaches that make use of epistemic and modal logics (e.g. [16,1923]), ours is 
based on a familar, nonmodal, nonclassical logic. This is an important difference that 
may easily be overlooked. In particular, it means that we can characterise stable 
inference in logics having essentially the same logical vocabulary as that of logic 
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programming, without needing to translate logic programs into a richer, modal lan- 
guage. Secondly, an advantage of our method is that it can be used to derive several 
of the known modal characterisations of stable inference. Fat instance, using Theo- 
rem I, and the well-known Giidel translation of H into modal S4, one obtains the 
embedding result of [23] as a simple corollary. Similarly, other embeddings of stable 
models into nonmonotonic modal logics. of the kind discussed in [ 16,191, can be de- 
rived from Theorem 1 using general results about modal embeddings of intermediate 
logics, as studied in {4]. 
6. Extensions and future work 
We have explained stable inference as follows: the stable consequences of a pro- 
gram f7 are those sentences true in all (intuitionistically) complete and consistent ex- 
tensions of I7 obtainable b_v addhg just negated atoms to EL By regarding those 
negated atoms as forming an explanans in the context of an explanatory framework, 
one may rela,, _ +p stable inference to a form of explanatory reasoning in intuitionistic 
logic H. For these purposes we can also take any logic stronger than H, providing 
it is properly contained in classical ogic. 
These results can be extended. We may equally allow I7 to be an extended logic 
program containing a new, strong negation operator, using the answer set semantics 
of (91. With the obvious modifications all of our results hold for extended programs, 
where intuitionistic !ogic is replaced by Nelson’s constructive logic with strong nega- 
tion [Xl]. Similarly, in place of intermediate logics we may consider their least strong 
negation extensions, formed by adding Nelson’s negation and the axioms governing 
it: these are always conservative extensions (see e.g. Kracht [14]). For the strong ne- 
ation version of equilibrium logic, see 1241. 
Future work may focus on applying these basic notions to more 
them to hk\ndle other kinds af semantics, and on studyi 
ill and implementation issues, 
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